Showing posts with label Spanish economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Spanish economy. Show all posts

In Spain, mortgage funding is different

Spain is different. The slogan, which the tourism industry used in the 1950s to celebrate the country’s identity and culture, is nowadays something of a joke. Among Spaniards, the old line is an expression of self-deprecation, of a sentiment of quirkiness and inferiority, which constitutes a fundamental part of the Spanish ethos. When it comes to funding mortgages, however, Spain is different in a good way.

Like so many other parts of the developed world, Spain has experienced a housing fever over the last ten years. Banks have thus been lending at a hectic pace. Because bank deposits do not provide reliable and sufficient liquidity to fund the mortgages, lenders everywhere have resorted to mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and mortgage bonds.

An investor in a “standard” MBS holds a claim on the issuer of the security, not on the mortgagee, even if he buys securities directly from the originator of the mortgages.

In Spain, however, at least one link in the chain of investors has a stake in the original loans. In order to securitize mortgages, Spanish banks first issue participations, which are shares in each of the mortgages included in a pool. A holder of participations receives a percentage of the interest and principal of the mortgages from the originator, who in turn receives the payments from the Janes and Joes (or Pacos and Dolores) who obtained the mortgage loans. The participation holder has thus a claim on both the originator and the mortgagee. More importantly, the originator retains a certain fraction —100 minus the percentage of the participation— of each and every mortgage created, turning originator and participation holder into co-creditors. In a second step, holders of the participations may form pools and then issue securities that represent stakes in those pools of participations.

This scheme provides a form of risk-sharing between originators and participation holders, which is conducive to higher lending standards. Originators are not off the hook when they sell the participations, because they keep a share of each mortgage. That makes them more careful when assessing the creditworthiness of mortgage applicants, and reduces the chance of overly loose credit standards. And participation holders have a stronger incentive to keep an eye on individual mortgagees than if they had a claim on the originating institution only. (Read this post at Calculated Risk about this subject.)

* * *

The second source of mortgage funding for originators is the so-called covered bond. This is a debt instrument issued by a credit institution and secured by a pool of mortgage loans or public debt or even MBS themselves. These bonds pay coupons and principal, just like any other bond. The investor has a claim on the issuer of the bond and, if the latter defaults, on the pool of loans (not on individual loans).

In most European countries, where covered bonds are popular, a set of cover assets is set aside for each bond issue. In Spain, however, all mortgages of the issuer constitute collateral for the bond. The risk of the bond depends thus on thousands of separate individual loans, with varying credit quality, not just sub-prime or fixed-rate 30-year loans.

The amount of outstanding bonds has experienced an astonishing growth in Spain, thanks in part to the participation of regional savings banks. That has some people fretting, because the business of each of those small institutions is too dependent on local economic conditions. But those banks, known as “cajas” o “caixes,” formed a coalition that has become the largest issuer of covered bonds in the country: AyT Cédulas Cajas. (The composition of the coalition varies by issue.) By pooling their mortgages into a single issue, the risk of the bond depends on dozens of local real estate markets, spread all over the country.

But perhaps the most important reason why the Spanish financial system is unlikely to suffer a meltdown is the virtual absence of Special Investment Vehicles (SIV) and conduits. These animals allow banks to move mortgage-backed securities off their balance sheets, thus obscuring the exposure of individual institutions and escaping capital requirements.

Not in Spain. The Bank of Spain, scarred by a financial crisis in the 1980s, demanded a long time ago that lenders post an 8% capital charge against SIV assets. The result: a relative absence of off-balance mortgage risk. Surely, Spanish banks have suffered losses, but much smaller than those of their European neighbors. That is remarkable considering the size of Spain’s mortgage-backed issues, only second to the UK’s. (Read this article in the Financial Times, Feb. 1) From here, then, my sincere bravo to the Bank of Spain.

* * *

Six months after the beginning of the credit crisis, back in August 2007, Spanish lenders show signs of liquidity stress. The market for covered bonds is practically inactive, and there is an obvious mismatch between the maturity of mortgages (20, 30 or 50 years) and the liquidity needs of originators.

But the policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) is proving very useful here: Europe’s banker has long allowed its members to use mortgage-backed bonds as collateral. So Spanish lenders are simply issuing covered bonds, keeping them instead of selling them to investors, and using them to borrow from the ECB at the weekly auctions: unprecedented, odd, but nothing to worry about.

The default rates of Spanish mortgagees are still near historical lows, even after months of rising mortgage payments. If the macroeconomic forecasts for the eurozone are roughly accurate, growth will slow down, inflation will subside, and the ECB will cut interest rates, providing relief to debtors. So when the liquidity crisis goes away, Spanish banks will be sitting on piles of solvent mortgage loans. There is no looming solvency crisis here.

UPDATE (3/6/08):
I found this graph of default rates on mortgage loans here.



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Ni 2010 ni 2090, más bien 2050

En una entrevista concedida a El País el pasado lunes (15-1-07), el presidente José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero afirmó que España va a superar a Alemania en renta por cápita “en dos o tres años”. En sus propias palabras, “De aquí al 2010 les podemos superar perfectamente. Igualar y superar ligeramente”. Dichas afirmaciones fueron ayer replicadas por el Partido Popular, a través de su secretario ejecutivo de política económica y empleo, Miguel Arias Cañete. Según este último, España tardará 84 años en alcanzar el PIB per cápita de Alemania, o sea, que la convergencia se producirá en 2090.

A la vista de la disparidad de las cifras, me ha parecido evidente que uno de los dos, Zapatero o Arias Cañete, está haciendo previsiones poco realistas, y me he puesto a hacer mis propios números. La tarea no es nada difícil. Para hacer una previsión de la fecha de convergencia entre ambos países, lo único que necesitamos es el PIB por cápita de cada país en la actualidad, y previsiones de las tasas de crecimiento del PIB y de la población, para cada país, para el futuro. Todas mis cifras provienen de Eurostat, la agencia europea de estadísticas. Para calcular el PIB por cápita actual, he usado el PIB durante 2005 y la población total media durante ese mismo año. (2005 es el año más reciente para el que hay cifras disponibles de población.) En 2005, los PIB por cápita de Alemania y España, a precios constantes de 1995, fueron 26.677 y 15.082 euros, respectivamente. Es decir, la renta española estaba en un 57% de la alemana. Sólo con este dato deberíamos concluir que la convergencia “en dos o tres años” va a ser difícil de conseguir.

Para calcular las tasas de crecimiento futuras del PIB y de la población, he calculado la tasa media de crecimiento de cada una de estas magnitudes entre 1991 y 2005, para cada país, y he asumido que cada país va a crecer a esa tasa media histórica en el futuro (1991 es el primer año para el que disponemos de cifras consistentes para Alemania, pues es el año de la reunificación). En Alemania la tasa media histórica de crecimiento del PIB ha sido del 1.4% y en España ha sido del 3.1%; en cuanto a la población, las tasas han sido del 0.2 y 0.8 por ciento, respectivamente. Con dichas cifras, y aplicando una sencilla fórmula, calculo que la convergencia se produciría en el año 2054.

Es cierto que, en los últimos años, España ha crecido relativamente más deprisa que en décadas anteriores, y Alemania más despacio. Así que he rehecho mis cálculos aplicando las tasas de crecimiento históricas entre 1997 y 2005, en vez de entre 1991 y 2005. El resultado ahora es que España alcanzará a Alemania en 2047. Si uso tasas de crecimiento aún más recientes, por ejemplo entre 2000 y 2005, la fecha de convergencia es 2056 (más tardía debido a que en estos últimos cinco años la población española ha crecido más rápidamente que en años anteriores, lo cual reduce el crecimiento del PIB por cápita).

Como último supuesto, si el PIB español creciese a la vertiginosa tasa del 4 por ciento, si el PIB alemán no creciese en absoluto, y si la población creciese al mismo ritmo en ambos países (supuestos todos ellos poco realistas), España alcanzaría a Alemania en el año 2020.

En conclusión, si todo va más o menos como en el pasado reciente, España alcanzará a Alemania, en términos de PIB por cápita, a mediados del siglo XXI; y aun haciendo supuestos muy favorables a España y poco favorables a Alemania, dicha convergencia no se produciría en 2010. No se fíen de las alocadas afirmaciones de nuestros políticos, incluso si aparecen en medios de comunicación respetables. Mejor hagan sus propios números.