Showing posts with label central banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label central banks. Show all posts

Monday, July 7, 2014

Keynesian Yellen vs. Wicksellian BIS

Gavyn Davies writes an excellent summary of the debate between the"mainstream-central bank-Keynesian" view of the economy and the "alternative-BIS-Wicksellian" view. (It's on the blog section of the Financial Times, but I'm not sure if it's gated.)

Davies juxtaposes a recent speech by Yellen to the BIS annual report, both of which, I'm sure, are excellent readings.

Similarities between the two views:
There is agreement that financial crashes that trigger “balance sheet recessions” lead to deeper and longer recessions than occur in a normal business cycle. There is also agreement that inflation is not likely to re-appear any time soon, and that the current recovery should be used to strengthen the balance sheets of the financial sector through regulatory and macro-prudential policy.
Wicksellians and Keynesians have radically opposed views, however, on what caused the great financial crisis:
The BIS views the crash as the culmination of successive economic cycles during which the central banks adopted an asymmetric policy stance, easing monetary policy substantially during downturns, while tightening only modestly during recoveries[...]On this view, monetary policy has been too easy on average, leading to a long term upward trend in debt and risky financial investments. The financial cycle, which extends over much longer periods than the usual business cycle in output and inflation, eventually peaked in 2008[...]In contrast, the mainstream central bank view denies that monetary policy has been biased towards accommodation over the long term. Ms Yellen’s speech claims that higher interest rates in the mid 2000s would have done little to prevent the housing and financial bubble from developing. She certainly admits that mistakes were made, but they were in the regulatory sphere, where there was insufficient understanding of the new financial instruments that would eventually exacerbate the effects of the housing crash. Higher interest rates, she says, would have led to much worse unemployment, without doing much to reduce leverage and dangerous financial innovation.
Because central banks are using the "wrong model," their policies are inadequate, and even exacerbating some problems:
[...]even now, the BIS says that the central banks are attempting to validate the long term rise in debt and leverage, instead of allowing it to correct itself. Excessive debt, it contends, is preventing the rise in capital investment needed for a healthy recovery. Financial and household balance sheets need to be repaired (ie debt needs to be reduced) before this can take place.[...]The BIS argues that zero interest rates and quantitative easing are becoming increasingly ineffective in boosting GDP growth. Instead, they are artificially inflating asset prices, and blocking a necessary correction in excessive debt. Macro-prudential and regulatory policy might be helpful here, but will not be sufficient. The main risk is that the exit from these accommodative monetary policies may come too late.
The Yellen view is in sharp contrast to this. There is no admission that quantitative easing is becoming ineffective, or that excessive debt should be reversed [3]. There is an outright rejection of the view that interest rates have been too low throughout previous cycles. If anything, the “secular stagnation” argument is adopted, suggesting that real interest rates have been and remain too high, because the zero lower bound prevents them from falling as far as would be required to reach the equilibrium real rate. On this view, the danger is that the exit from accommodative monetary policies will come too early, not too late.
One massive difference between the two views of the economy is that the BIS would prefer to see a tightening of both monetary and fiscal policies, whereas Keynesians think that neither should be tightened "too soon." On fiscal policy:
This divergence of views on economic capacity leads in turn to a major difference on appropriate fiscal policy. The BIS implies that cyclically-adjusted fiscal policy is looser than it seems, because GDP can never return to its earlier trends. The Keynesian/Yellen view is that fiscal policy should not be tightened too soon, and perhaps not at all until output has fully recovered.

Thursday, June 19, 2014

Four stories of quantitative easing

I strongly recommend this paper (no math, some jargon) to those of you interested in monetary policy. Brett Fawley and Christopher Neely walk the reader through the "quantitative easing" programs of the Big Four central banks (Fed, BoE, BoJ, ECB), from 2008 through 2012. Aside from the month-by-month, bank-by-bank chronicle, this paper provides great charts, tables, and links to the sources.

For a wider cross-section of central banks that have doubled the monetary base, dating back to the early 1990s, see Anderson, Gascon, and Liu (2010).


What I got from this reading:

1) There's a difference, at least in appearance, between "quantitative easing" and "credit easing." QE has as explicit target to expand, in a pronounced and persistent way, the liabilities of the central bank (i.e. the monetary base, or M0). QE can take the form of asset purchases or lending programs. Credit easing, on the other hand, intends to improve liquidity or the cost of credit, perhaps in specific credit markets. Credit easing may lead to an enlarged balance sheet, and that's often the case, but credit easing does not target an expansion of the monetary base.

2) Only some of the BoJ's and the BoE's programs can be properly described as QE policies, because they explicitly stated the goal to enlarge the central bank's liabilities. The Fed and the ECB have not formally engaged in QE. In practice, however, just looking at balance sheets, it's difficult to tell un-sterilized credit easing from QE. Fawley and Neely seem to lean towards considering that any policy that increases the monetary base substantially and for a long period is QE, whether as a stated goal or de facto.

3) An exhaustive list of references to the QE and credit easing programs implemented by those four banks through 2012.

Tuesday, June 17, 2014

What caught my eye

1. The Bank of Japan's balance sheet is about to get much, much bigger, by Sober Look, via the excellent MacroDigest.
Here is why. Credit Suisse for example projects that Japan's inflation rate has peaked and is about to begin declining. In fact CS researchers see a complete divergence between the BoJ's own projection of inflation and reality. A number of other researchers (for example Scotiabank) agree.
2. Big Ideas in Macroeconomics, by Kartik Athreya. Noah Smith's excellent, three-part review makes me want to read it.

3. Is this an example of financial repression?
Federal Reserve officials have discussed whether regulators should impose exit fees on bond funds to avert a potential run by investors, underlining concern about the vulnerability of the $10tn corporate bond market.
The article is somewhat ambiguous on whether the exit fees would apply only to corporate-bond funds or to government-bond funds as well.
4. An organization I didn't know about: OMFIF, or Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum. They put together commentary, analysis, surveys, conferences, etc. around central banking. This week they were in the news because they published a report showing that "public-sector institutions" (including central banks, public pension funds, and sovereign funds) are buying more and more equities. The report is not available online.

5. Speaking about central banks, I just signed up for the "Grand Central" newsletter, the WSJ's blogging service about, well, central banking.

6. Blog recommendation. A mysterious Jesse Livermore writes (mostly) about the stock market on Philosophical Economics. I particularly enjoyed this post, but I would say everything he writes is worth reading.

7. The macroeconomic effects of asset purchases, by Martin Weale and Tomasz Wieladek on VOX EU. I am skeptical of the VARs (how are shocks identified?), but here it is anyways.
Our results suggest that an asset-purchase shock that results in an announcement worth 1% of nominal GDP leads to a rise in real GDP of about 0.36% in the US and 0.18% in the UK; and to a rise in the CPI of 0.38% in the US and 0.3% in the UK. These findings are encouraging, because they suggest that asset purchases can be effective in stabilising output and prices. The implied UK Phillips curve is steeper than in the US, meaning that the same change in output would have a relatively greater impact on UK inflation. Quantitatively, monetary easing leading to a 1% rise in output results in a 1% rise in the US CPI, whereas in the UK the CPI rises by 1.5%. These estimates of the inflation–output trade-off are similar to those that previous studies reported for conventional (interest rate-based) monetary policy. Table 1 compares the implied effect on output and prices with that reported in previous studies of unconventional monetary policy. For real GDP, our reported figures are very similar to those reported in previous studies. For the US, we also find a similar effect on the CPI, but for the UK, our results suggest that the impact on the CPI is almost three times as large as the effect reported in Baumeister and Benati (2013) and Kapetanios et al. (2012).
8. A note on Piketty and diminishing returns to capital. Highly recommended by Tyler Cowen.